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ABSTRACT 
 
Social network analysis is now widely used to investigate the dynamics of infectious disease 
spread from person to person. Vaccination dramatically disrupts the disease transmission 
process on a contact network, and indeed, sufficiently high vaccination rates can disrupt 
the process to such an extent that disease transmission on the network is effectively halted. 
Here, we build on mounting evidence that health behaviors - such as vaccination, and 
refusal thereof - can spread through social networks through a process of complex 
contagion that requires social reinforcement. Using network simulations that model both 
the health behavior and the infectious disease spread, we find that under otherwise 
identical conditions, the process by which the health behavior spreads has a very strong 
effect on disease outbreak dynamics. This variability in dynamics results from differences 
in the topology within susceptible communities that arise during the health behavior 
spreading process, which in turn depends on the topology of the overall social network. 
Our findings point to the importance of health behavior spread in predicting and 
controlling disease outbreaks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Social network analysis is now widely used to investigate the dynamics of infectious disease 
spread from person to person, conceptualizing pathogen transmission by a diffusion process on 
social contact networks. A rich body of literature has explored the role of topological contact 
network properties such as heterogeneity in degree distributions (1, 2), cluster coefficients (3-5), 
and community structure (6-8) on disease dynamics. Most network-based disease dynamics 
models assume that everyone in the network is susceptible, and the overall contact network is 
taken to be the network on which the disease spreads. For many diseases, however, prior 
epidemics (9) and public health efforts such as vaccination (10) effectively remove individuals 
from the network by rendering them immune. It is therefore important to understand how these 
processes shape the topological properties of the network of susceptible individuals. Here, we 
will focus on susceptibility-promoting behaviors, and how the transmission of such behaviors 
shapes the network of susceptible individuals. We will use vaccination as a prime example of 
susceptibility-promoting behaviors. 
 
Outbreaks of vaccine-preventable disease are more common when vaccination rates decline (11). 
High vaccination rates are therefore essential to prevent such outbreaks. In principle, partial 
vaccination coverage (i.e. less than 100%) can be sufficient to prevent disease outbreaks (12, 13), 
because a population can be protected by herd immunity if the prevalence of susceptible 
individuals is held below a certain threshold that depends on biological characteristics of a 
disease. However, outbreaks have also been observed repeatedly in countries where vaccination 
coverages have been increasing at already very high levels (7).  For example, in 2010, many 
European nations reported over 10,000 measles cases while maintaining vaccination coverage 
rates in excess of the WHO-prescribed target of 90% (14). A growing body of research suggests 
that non-random distribution of unvaccinated individuals serves to counterbalance the benefits 
afforded by high vaccination coverage. Herd immunity is predicated on the assumption that 
susceptibility is spatially uniform, but geographic clustering of vaccine refusal has been widely 
observed (15-19). Furthermore, Pertussis outbreaks have been associated with the clustering of 
exemptions to school immunization requirements in the US (20). These studies support the 
supposition that communities of the intentionally unvaccinated pose a risk to local communities 
as well as global eradication efforts. While the causes of susceptibility clustering remain unclear, 
peer influence has been shown to be a significant determinant of vaccine uptake (21-23).  
 
The spread of health behaviors such as vaccination is often modelled as a simple contagion 
process, similar to biological contagion, where each exposure event contributes equally to the 
probability of adoption of the behavior. However, there is increasing evidence (24-26) that the 
process of social transmission of behaviors is governed by a process of complex contagion, 
where social reinforcement - i.e. multiple exposures from different peers - are necessary for 
adoption. Here we develop a model to investigate the effects of simple and complex contagion of 
negative vaccination sentiment on the likelihood and size of disease outbreaks on a social contact 
network. Our results indicate that complex contagion increases the size of disease outbreaks, i.e. 
that outbreaks are largest when the spread of negative vaccination sentiment requires social 
reinforcement as a prerequisite to adoption. Outbreak size is further maximized when the 
underlying network topology is neither highly structured (e.g. lattice) nor highly unstructured 
(e.g. random), but rather of the “small world” type in between. We find that this is due to the 
interplay between the two processes, social contagion and biological contagion, and the 
topologies of the two networks on which these processes occur (social contagion occurs on the 
full network, whereas biological contagion occurs on the subnetwork of susceptible individuals 
only).  
 
METHODS 
Our model is split into two time periods. In the first time period, we simulate the diffusion of 
negative vaccination sentiment - and subsequent vaccine refusal - on a social network. In the 
following, second time period, we simulate the spread of the infectious disease against which the 
vaccine confers complete immunity. Both processes are typically associated with considerable 
complexity; however, in order to keep the model tractable, we will make a few simplifying 
assumptions that we will outline below. We will further explore these limitations in the 
Discussion section.  
 
The spread of both vaccine refusal and the infectious disease are modelled on a static social 
network of 𝑁 = 5000 individuals with average degree 𝑘 = 10. Using the Watts-Strogatz model 
(3), we model an inclusive range of network topologies depending on the rewiring probability, 𝑝. 
This model allows us to capture highly structured ring-lattices (small 𝑝), highly unstructured 
graphs (large 𝑝) and a variety of small world network topologies in between [Figure 1A].  
 
Individuals participate in an opinion formation process that continues until the frequency of 
negative vaccination sentiment, 𝑓!! reaches a fixed value. The assumption of a fixed frequency 
of negative vaccination sentiment is in principle unrealistic, but it allows for a direct comparison 
of different simulation settings with identical vaccination coverage (because vaccination 
coverage = 1− 𝑓!!).  
 
The spread of negative vaccination sentiment follows a straightforward exposure - adoption 
process. Initially, everyone in the network has a non-negative vaccination sentiment. Once an 
individual’s number of exposures to negative vaccination sentiment reaches a threshold, 𝑇, the 
individual adopts the negative vaccination sentiment. If 𝑇 = 1 then the process captures simple 
contagion; if 𝑇 > 1, the process captures complex contagion (26, 27). There are two ways by 
which an individual can be exposed to the negative vaccination sentiment: (i) the individual is 
exposed by a neighboring individual in the social network, or (ii) the individual is generally 
exposed by any other source not captured by the social contact network (e.g., through the media). 
In the first case of direct social exposure, an individual can be exposed only once by a 
neighboring contact. In the second case of general exposure, individuals can be exposed multiple 
times: since general exposure is assumed to be any other source outside of the social network, 
each such exposure is assumed to be from a unique source. By assuming that general exposure is 
ongoing at all times during the opinion formation process, we can compare three situations: 
general exposure only, general exposure and simple contagion, and general exposure and 
complex contagion [Figure 1B].  
 
After an individual adopts the negative vaccination sentiment, neighboring contacts are exposed 
at rate Ω  (i.e. Ω is the probability of social exposure per timestep per contact). A proportion, 𝑟!", 
of the entire social network is generally exposed to negative vaccination sentiment at each 
timestep. Each individual’s number of unique social exposures, 𝑒!, and general exposures, 𝑒!, 
are recorded. An individual adopts the negative vaccination sentiment when their aggregate 
number of unique exposure events exceeds the aforementioned adoption threshold,  𝑒! + 𝑒! ≥ 𝑇.  Once the frequency of negative vaccination sentiment, 𝑓!!, reaches a fixed value, 
all individuals with non-negative sentiments are vaccinated [Figure 1C].  
 
After vaccination, a susceptible (i.e. non-vaccinated) individual is selected at random to seed a 
simple (SIR) disease epidemic. Unless noted otherwise, susceptible individuals are infected by 
infectious neighbors at rate 𝛽 = 10!! per contact and timestep, and subsequently recover at rate 𝛾 = 10!! per timestep [Figure 1D]. Given that the average degree of the initial network is 𝑘 = 10, the infectious disease’s basic reproductive number can be calculated as 𝑅! = !! ∙ 𝑘 ∙ (1+𝑐𝑣!)(28) where 𝑐𝑣 is the coefficient of variation of the network’s degree distribution. In the 
case where the entire network would be susceptible to the disease, the resulting 𝑅! of ~10 would 
require a vaccination coverage of  1− !!! ≈ 90%  to provide for herd immunity, a value that was 
chosen to lie approximately in the middle between moderately transmissible diseases such as 
influenza (with an estimated 𝑅! between 1 and 3) and highly transmissible diseases such as 
pertussis and measles (where the latter has 𝑅! estimates in excess of 10). The infection process 
continues until all infected individuals have recovered. For each round of opinion formation 
considered, multiple independent disease epidemics are simulated. For each epidemic simulation, 
we record the number and size of susceptible communities, or connected components of 
susceptible individuals, as well as the final epidemic size.  We define an outbreak as a final 
epidemic size larger than 25 individuals, which corresponds to 0.5% of the total population.   
 
RESULTS 
The topological distribution of individual susceptibility on a population’s contact network 
strongly affects the probability of a disease outbreak in that population. To begin, we will look at 
three different sentiment spreading scenarios (random, simple and complex) on three different 
types of network topologies, defined by the rewiring probability (𝑝) : highly structured (𝑝 = 0.01), intermediately structured, i.e. “small world” (𝑝 = 0.1), and highly unstructured 𝑝 = 0.5 . We assume a population’s baseline risk of experiencing an outbreak to be the 
frequency of disease outbreaks when the formation of public opinion regarding negative 
vaccination sentiment is a general exposure process that occurs in the absence of social 
contagion. The outcome of this process is equivalent to a random distribution of vaccination 
status on the network, and as a consequence, outbreaks are rare and approach zero as the 
proportion of vaccinated individuals approaches the herd immunity threshold of 90% [Figure 
2A]. We then compare the results of this baseline scenario to two social spreading scenarios, 
simple and complex contagion. In both scenarios, sentiments predominantly spread through 
social exposure [Figure S1], but it is worth repeating that general exposure is ongoing at low 
rates. When negative vaccination sentiment spreads by simple contagion, outbreaks dramatically 
increase in frequency compared to the random baseline scenario, and even occur when 
vaccination coverage has approached the herd immunity threshold. However, at vaccination 
coverage of 95%, no outbreaks occur in the simple contagion scenario. The situation is different 
when negative vaccination sentiment spreads by complex contagion: outbreaks are generally 
more frequent than even under the simple contagion scenario, and importantly, they still occur at 
95% vaccination coverage, an outcome not observed with simple contagion. Overall, the results 
are strongly dependent on the way by which negative vaccination sentiments spread. 
 
It is important to note that the original network topology affects the disease outcome in two 
ways. First, the network topology will affect how negative vaccination sentiments spread. 
Second, once the negative vaccination sentiments have spread, the structure of the remaining 
smaller subnetworks of susceptible individuals - the networks on which the disease can spread - 
will affect disease dynamics. Thus, the network topology of the original network will also affect 
the topology of the emerging susceptible networks, simply because the susceptible networks are 
subnetworks of the original network. We will first focus on the number and size of susceptible 
subnetworks that are generated by negative vaccination sentiment spread, and we will refer to 
these subnetworks as communities (defined as a group of nodes where each node in the group is 
connected to each other node in the group by a path, but to no other node outside of that group - 
this is also known as a weakly connected component in graph theory). The size and frequency of 
outbreaks will be strongly affected by the number and size of susceptible communities. Second, 
we will focus on the topology of the susceptible communities, and its effect on disease dynamics. 
 
Complex contagion of negative vaccination sentiment produces slightly fewer susceptible 
communities [Figure 2B] than simple contagion. Under simple contagion, each general exposure 
of a non-exposed individual leads to the adoption of the negative vaccination sentiment, at which 
point it can spread from this initial seed and give rise to an expanding susceptible community. 
Under complex contagion, both the adoption and the spread of negative vaccination sentiment 
proceeds more slowly because of the 𝑇 > 1 requirement. Because we run simulations until a 
fixed fraction 𝑓!! of the population has adopted the negative vaccination sentiment, the slower 
spread in the complex contagion scenario means that there is more time for new communities to 
emerge. However, the initial generation of a novel community is such a rare event in the 
complex contagion scenario that it more than compensates for the effect of a longer time frame, 
resulting in fewer susceptible communities overall than in the simple contagion scenario. This 
finding is consistent over a wide range of parameters [Figure S2].  
 
Our assumption that a fixed fraction 𝑓!! of the population adopts the negative vaccination 
sentiment means that the number of communities relates directly to the average size of these 
communities. In particular, since complex contagion generally produces fewer communities than 
simple contagion, these communities are on average larger. However, the average size alone can 
be a poor guide to predict final sizes of disease outbreaks because the community size 
distribution is often skewed, typically with one large community and a few very small ones. To 
capture the distribution in a single number that relates to expected outbreak size, we used a 
quasi-deterministic version of the model with deterministic disease transmission (𝛽 = 1) and 
without recovery (𝛾 = 1). In this quasi-deterministic model, the susceptible index case is chosen 
randomly, after which the disease outbreak will completely saturate the community of 
susceptible individuals in which it was started. Such outbreaks represent an upper bound – and 
thus worst-case scenario – of the final size in a given community. Since there are often multiple 
susceptible communities, we can calculate an average upper bound,  𝐹, of final outbreak size.  𝐹 = !!!!!         
Hence, 𝐹 is a weighted mean size of all susceptible communities 𝐶! in the contact network. The 
susceptible community’s size serves to weight the mean, because a randomly infected index case 
is more likely to be a member of larger communities. This estimate assumes that the disease 
epidemic will deterministically saturate the index case’s community, regardless of the size and 
topology of the community. In the quasi-deterministic simulations, we find that complex 
contagion produces sets of communities that have higher upper bounds in outbreak sizes than 
simple contagion [Figure 2C]. This effect is particularly pronounced in more structured networks 
(i.e. small 𝑝); in more randomized networks, the average distance between any two nodes is low 
(3), and the set of nodes that have adopted the negative vaccination sentiment are more likely to 
be connected in a single component simply due to the underlying original network structure, 
rather than due to the effects of social contagion.  
 
If we relax these quasi-deterministic constraints and simulate stochastic infectious disease 
epidemics with 𝛽 = 0.1 and 𝛾 = 0.1, we find that increases in rewiring probability, 𝑝, are no 
longer predictive of increases in final epidemic size [Figure 2D]. While all vaccine-averse 
individuals are equally susceptible to infection, the communities to which they belong are not 
equally susceptible to saturation by infectious disease. This variability results from differences in 
the topology within susceptible communities, which arises during the opinion formation process. 
Under complex contagion, individuals can adopt negative vaccination sentiment by social 
contagion or general exposure as well as a combination of the two processes. As the topology of 
the initial contact network becomes less structured and more random (i.e. large 𝑝 ), the 
availability of social reinforcement decreases (25), resulting in an increased proportion of 
adoption events that are caused by a mix of general and social exposures [Figure S1]. 
Alternatively, under simple contagion, the proportion of general or social adopters depends only 
on the rates of general and social exposures rather than the underlying network topology. 
Because infectious individuals may recover before infecting a neighbor, the increased path 
redundancy caused by complex contagion ensures that an infected individual has ample 
opportunity to transmit to a susceptible neighbor before recovering, reducing the chance of 
stochastic fade-outs. This can be best captured by calculating the mean basic reproductive 
number (𝑅!) in a susceptible community - its value will depend solely on the mean degree and 
variance of the degree distribution, as the transmission and recovery rates are identical. As can 
be seen in Figure 2E, 𝑅!  is greater in communities generated by complex contagion than in 
communities generated by simple contagion. (Note that 𝑅! is less than 10 under both simple and 
complex contagion because vaccinated individuals are removed by virtue of their immunity to 
infection, and the average degree (𝑘) of susceptible communities is less than 10.) 
 
Taken together, the results suggest that infectious disease outbreaks are substantially larger on 
contact networks shaped by complex social contagion than on networks shaped by simple 
contagion. They also suggest the outbreaks are largest in networks whose topology is neither 
highly structured nor highly random, but rather best described as “small world” topologies, 
characteristic of many social (contact) networks (29, 30). The susceptible communities generated 
by social contagion in highly structured networks are smaller on average, but the resulting 𝑅! is 
higher in these communities - vice versa, susceptible communities generated by social contagion 
in highly random networks are larger on average, but the resulting 𝑅! is lower. In the parameter 
space of small world networks, both the average community size as well as 𝑅! are moderate, but 
in combination they generate the largest outbreaks in the parameter space tested. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The primary finding of our research is that infectious disease outbreaks are larger and occur 
more frequently when susceptibility-inducing behaviors, such as negative vaccination sentiment, 
spread across contact networks by complex contagion rather than by simple contagion. Contact 
redundancy, or the density of social reinforcement, within a susceptible community is a strong 
determinant of both the size and frequency of disease outbreaks. The density of potential social 
reinforcement is determined by how structured or random the contact network’s topology is prior 
to the period of opinion formation. Complex contagion of negative vaccination sentiment fosters 
redundancy within communities of unvaccinated individuals, resulting in susceptible 
communities that are more readily saturated by infectious diseases. Our results indicate that 
standard estimates (31) of vaccination rates to attain herd immunity can be highly insufficient to 
protect a community if clustering of susceptible individuals is caused by the social spread of 
negative vaccination sentiments, and particularly so if the contagion process is complex, 
requiring social reinforcement.  
 
Given that peer influence is a significant determinant of vaccine uptake (21-23) in regions where 
vaccine availability is not a limiting factor, conditions found in high-income nations may serve 
as early indicators of future hurdles to global eradication efforts. A recent survey study of 
hospital workers illustrates that the expressed reasons for vaccine refusal are most strongly 
associated with myths and urban legends about immunization, leading to concerns about adverse 
effects and insufficient efficacy (32). This problem of perception is traditionally approached 
from a game-theoretic perspective wherein individuals are assumed to perform a complex risk-
analysis with respect to financial cost, treatment efficacy, the risk of infection, etc. However, 
rather than disentangle such a complicated decision, individuals may defer to social 
reinforcement as a rough proxy for an informed cost-benefit analysis. Modeling a complex social 
contagion that affects disease-susceptibility allows us to underscore the role of social deferment 
in the adoption of health-behaviors that are both risky and beneficial.   
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to look at the effect of complex contagion of 
vaccination behavior on infectious disease dynamics, and as such it is limited in several ways. 
We have focused on the effect of a minimal change in the adoption threshold 𝑇 that differentiates 
complex from simple contagions. There is little doubt that adoption threshold is variable between 
both individuals and social contagions themselves. Sociologists have long recognized the 
influential role of “early adopters”: individuals characterized by a low adoption threshold to the 
contagion under investigation. A recent theoretical model (33) explores cascade dynamics when 
early adopters are also more active and enthusiastic spreaders. Barash et al. (34) have also 
considered cascade dynamics when the adoption threshold is not only variable, but also 
determined relative to the proportion of neighboring adopters. Both are particularly valuable 
lines of inquiry as we consider contagions in competition with other, mutually exclusive 
contagions. 
 
Further, we do not explicitly simulate the spread of positive vaccination sentiment; rather 
positive sentiment is treated as a default position for individuals who do not adopt negative 
vaccination sentiment by the end of the opinion formation period. Oppositional social contagions 
(e.g., positive and negative vaccination sentiment) are often in competition for individual 
attention (35), but this paradigm may not apply to vaccination in developed nations because 
immunization is often a default prerequisite for access to public institutions. As a result, those 
who may hold a neutral sentiment are incentivized to vaccinate. Institutional immunization in 
developed nations ensures a wide and largely uniform distribution of vaccinated individuals, 
though it does not preclude further contagious spread of positive vaccination sentiment.  Indeed, 
the prevalence of positive vaccination sentiment may have synergistic or antagonistic effects on 
the spread of negative vaccination sentiment.  
 
Finally, we model public opinion formation and the spread of infectious disease as two serial 
processes that occur on the same, static contact network. While these assumptions may be 
justified in some circumstances, they need to be relaxed in future studies. For example, modern 
communication technologies and services (mobile phones, social media, etc.) can result in 
communication networks that can be rather divergent from the contact networks upon which 
infectious diseases can spread. With respect to the temporal dynamics of the two spreading 
processes, we recognize that public opinion about the decision to vaccinate is a continuous, 
dynamic process that can be affected by the global and local prevalence of infectious disease 
(36). Furthermore, dynamic social interactions that are not captured by static contact networks 
are increasingly important in the realm of highly communicable diseases such as measles (5, 10, 
37). We hope that our assumptions are understood as necessary simplifications in this initial 
exploration that allow for the direct comparison of epidemic outcomes in susceptible 
communities whose only difference arises from either the simple or complex contagion of 
negative vaccination sentiment. 
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the complex contagion of negative vaccination sentiment 
followed by an SIR disease epidemic. White nodes denote non-adopters of a negative 
vaccination sentiment. Black nodes denote individuals who adopt a negative vaccination 
sentiment. Red nodes denote individuals who have been infected. (A) Initial social contact 
network. (B) After negative vaccination sentiment spreads by complex contagion during the 
period of opinion formation (C) After vaccination, and subsequent removal of immunized 
individuals from the susceptible contact network. (D) After a vaccine-preventable infectious 
disease spreads through the remaining susceptible network. 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated and simulated epidemiological measures if an infectious disease spreads 
through susceptible communities that are generated by the social transmission of negative 
vaccination sentiment. Parameter ranges for all simulations are shown. All points are averages 
based on 100 unique susceptible networks generated by stochastic simulations of social 
contagion. (A) Frequency at which infectious disease outbreaks occur in a population.  An 
outbreak is defined as a minimum final epidemic size of 25 (i.e. 0.5% of the total population size 
N=5000). For each unique network we ran 10,000 infectious disease simulations. (B) Number of 
distinct susceptible communities that are generated by the social transmission of negative 
vaccination sentiment.𝑟!" = 10!!, Ω = 10!! ↔ 10!!,   𝑓!! = 0.10. (C) Quasi-deterministic 
final epidemic size. Shaded region denotes 95% Confidence Intervals. 𝛽 = 1, 𝛾 = 0,   𝑟!" =10!!,   Ω = 10!! ↔ 10!!,   𝑓!! = 0.10. (D) Simulated final epidemic size. Shaded region denotes 
95% confidence intervals. 𝛽 = 10!!, 𝛾 = 10!!,   𝑟!" = 10!!, Ω = 10!! ↔ 10!!,     𝑓!! = 0.10. 
For each unique network we ran 10,000 infectious disease simulations  (E) Mean basic 
reproductive number (R0) of an infectious biological agent in susceptible communities that were 
generated by the social transmission of negative vaccination sentiment. 𝛽 = 0.1, 𝛾 = 0.1, 𝑟!" =10!!,   Ω = 10!! ↔ 10!!,   𝑓!! = 0.10 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S1: The susceptible population, categorized by the exposure events that 
caused adoption of negative vaccination sentiment. 100 simulations, 𝑟!" = 10!!,   Ω = 10!! ↔10!!,   𝑓!! = 0.10. 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S2:  The number of susceptible communities formed by either complex 
or simple contagion of negative vaccination sentiment. 100 simulations, 𝑟!" = 10!! ↔10!!,   Ω = 10!! ↔ 10!!,   𝑓!! = 0.10 
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